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L Introduction
The federal securities laws apply to any investment described by the
broad statutory definition of a "security"' unless an exemption applies. This
1. This Article discusses the two principal securities laws, the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1988 & Supp. 1991) [hereinafter 1933 Act], and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1988 & Supp. 1991) [hereinafter 1934 Act].
"Security" is defined in § 2(1) of the 1933 Act as follows:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or
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suggests that the type of business association and other aspects of the
investment's external form should not matter, and that the securities laws
should apply whenever appropriate for the protection of investors. Indeed,
the Supreme Court often has expressed this view.2
Yet this "substance-over-form" approach presents serious problems. At
its full extension, the approach would require the courts to analyze each
investment in the light of the function of the securities laws. Neither
investors nor issuers could ever know without litigation or an administrative
hearing whether the securities laws apply. This would not only increase
litigation, but also would make it difficult for the parties to make and price
their contracts with regard to the applicable level of regulation. These
problems will become more serious as investment markets develop new
types of business associations and "derivative" and other securities.3
So "form" must matter. The only question is, how much? Courts have,
in fact, emphasized form over substance by holding that a general partner-
ship interest is presumptively a nonsecurity, and that corporate stock is per
other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security,
certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest
therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or
privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign
currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a
"security", or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b. The 1934 Act defines "security" in similar terms, with minor exceptions
relating to mineral leases and the exclusion of instruments with a maturity of nine months
or less. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(10).
2. See infra text accompanying note 7.
3. See Jeff Strnad, Taxing New Financial Products: A Conceptual Framework, 46
STAN. L. REV. 569 (1994) (discussing costs of discontinuity and inconsistencies in tax rules
relating to new financial products). For other descriptions of possible legal implications and
complications associated with new investment products, see Daniel R. Fischel, Regulatory
Conflict and Entry Regulation of New Futures Contracts, 59 J. Bus. S85 (1986); David J.
Gilberg, Regulation of New Financial Instruments Under the Federal Securities and
Commodities Laws, 39 VAND. L. Rv. 1599 (1986); Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps, The Modern
Process of Financial Innovation and the Vulnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA.
L. REv. 333 (1989); Thomas A. Russo & Marlisa Vinciguerra, Financial Innovation and
Uncertain Regulation: Selected Issues Regarding New Product Development, 69 TEX. L.
REv. 1431 (199 1); Symposium-New Financial Products, the Modern Process of Financial
Innovation, and the Law, 69 TFx. L. REV. 1273 (1991).
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se a security.4 Thus, current law essentially lets the parties to closely held
firms choose whether the securities laws will apply by selecting their
business form.
The rapid acceptance of a relatively new form of business enter-
prise-the limited liability company (LLC)-raises new questions about the
application of this form-over-substance approach to closely held firms. Like
partnerships, LLCs are noncorporate firms whose members commonly
participate directly in management and so arguably have less need than
public corporation shareholders for mandatory disclosure rules. Yet, unlike
partners, LLC members have limited liability and sometimes do not
participate directly in management unless the agreement provides otherwise.
It is not clear, therefore, whether the general-partnership-as-"security"
analysis should be applied to LLC interests. While prominent securities law
commentators have discussed the application of the securities laws to
LLCs,5 none have addressed the critical underlying form-over-substance
issue.
This Article concludes that LLC interests, like partnership interests,
should be at least strongly presumed not to be "securities."6 This conclu-
sion is based on an analysis of the extent to which courts should rely on
investment form rather than substance-that is, "economic reality"-in
defining a security.
Part I of this Article reviews the reasons for treating general partnership
interests as presumptively nonsecurities. Part II discusses potential
distinctions between partnerships and-LLCs that might justify a different
result in the latter situation. Part I1[ undertakes a more detailed analysis of
the form-over-substance theory underlying the general partnership cases in
order to determine whether the courts should extend the general partnership
rule to LLCs. Part III shows why, in the light of this broader form-over-
substance theory, LLCs should be treated substantially like general
4. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Private Ordering and the Securities Laws: The
Case of General Partnerships, 42 CAsE W. RES. L. REv. 1 (1992).
5. See William J. Carney, Limited Liability Interests as Securities in Georgia, 30 GA.
ST. B.J. (forthcoming summer 1994); Mark A. Sargent, Are Limited Liability Company
Interests Securities?, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 1069 (1992); Marc I. Steinberg & Karen L.
Conway, The Limited Liability Company as a Security, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1105 (1992).
6. I have discussed this issue previously and briefly stated the conclusion I reach in
the present Article, but I did not fully articulate the reasoning supporting my conclusion.
See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE ON LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES § 14.02, at 14-5 (1992 & Supp. 1994).
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partnerships. Part IV discusses specific issues in applying the theory, while
Part V discusses possible qualifications of the analysis. Part VI contains
concluding remarks.
I. The Basic Theory: General Partnerships as Nonsecurities
This Part reviews the starting point for analysis of LLC interests under
the securities laws-the law and policy of general partnerships as non-
"securities."
A. Economic Reality vs. Private Ordering
The Supreme Court has stated that "in searching for the meaning and
scope of the word 'security' . . . form should be disregarded for substance
and the emphasis should be on economic reality. 7 This means that in each
case the courts must apply the general test for "investment contracts"
articulated in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.:'
[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a
contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a
common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of
the promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether the shares in
the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal interests
in the physical assets employed in the enterprise.9
The Howey factors can be explained in terms of the economic rationales for
mandatory federal disclosure.' Specifically, the "efforts of others" factor
identifies situations in which investors need the sort of detailed disclosures
and standardized formatting the securities laws mandate. The "common
enterprise" factor identifies situations involving public marketing of
securities in small lots to relatively passive investors in which centralized
disclosure is more cost-effective than leaving research to individual
investors. "
7. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
8. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
9. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
10. See Ribstein, supra note 4, at 18-24.
11. The formatting and investment-in-information bases for Howey rely heavily on the
rationales for mandatory disclosure articulated in Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669 (1984).
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Howey assumes that the law should determine what disclosures must be
made. A contrasting "private ordering" approach to interpreting the reach
of the securities laws would let the parties themselves determine whether the
securities laws apply. 2 The rationale for this approach is that contracting
parties ordinarily are better suited than courts or regulators to determine the
amount of disclosure that is appropriate in specific contexts. 3 Under this
approach, a court would enforce clear waivers even in transactions for which
mandatory disclosure otherwise seems appropriate under the Howey test.
The courts might permit exceptions to private ordering when there are
specific reasons for not enforcing the waiver, such as uncertainty about the
investors' intent to waive protection, or the investors seem incapable of
protecting their own interests.
The courts also could apply what might be called an "intermediate
private ordering" approach. Under this approach, the courts could hold that
the securities laws do not apply when investors were led by the form of the
transaction not to expect protection. This approach avoids the statutory
prohibition against waiver.'4 Rather than enforcing a "waiver," the courts
would consider the policy considerations favoring private ordering in
determining whether the nebulous term "investment contract" should be
deemed to refer to a particular transaction. This approach to waiver also is
consistent with the intent of the securities laws in that it accommodates
investor protection. Because the waiver is based on investor expectations,
it will not surprise unwary investors. Moreover, courts can fashion the
12. See generally Ribstein, supra note 4.
13. For discussions of whether investors ought to be able to contract for the amount
of liability for securities fraud, see Ian Ayres, Back to Basics:Regulating How Corporations
Speak to the Market, 77 VA. L. REv. 945 (1991) (arguing that investors probably would
want managers to warrant truthfulness of corporate speech to correct market inefficiency,
and that in all events, corporations should make clear whether their speech is warranted);
Marcel Kahan, Games, Lies, and Securities Fraud, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 750 (1992) (showing
how liability for certain types of lies may be beneficial to firms); Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory Revisited, 77 VA. L. REv. 1001 (1991)
(arguing against mandatory warranty of accuracy, noting high costs of such warranty and
availability of other means of protecting investors, including verification of corporate
information by securities analysts and others).
14. See Securities Act of 1933 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1988) ("Any condition,
stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with
any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be
void."). A similar provision prevents waiver of the 1934 Act. See Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 § 29(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1988).
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waiver to apply only to transactions for which it is generally inappropriate
to mandate disclosure.
B. Recognition of "Intermediate Private Ordering:" Partnership
Interests As Nonsecurities
Since Williamson v. Tucker, 5 most federal courts have held that there
is at least a strong presumption against characterizing general partnership
interests as securities under the Howey "efforts of others" test. 6 These
courts, in effect, apply something like the "intermediate private ordering"
approach discussed above in that they rely heavily on the existence of a
partnership relationship rather than on the details of the partners' manage-
ment role in each case. 7 The results in the partnership cases contrast with
15. 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981).
16. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
897 (1981) (holding that there is strong presumption against general partnership interest's
being security that can be overcome by showing that agreement left investor with no more
than powers of limited partner or that partners were, in effect, unable to exercise their
power because of their lack of sophistication or dependence on promoter's unique skills).
For examples of cases applying Williamson, see Youmans v. Simon, 791 F.2d 341, 346-47
(5th Cir. 1986) (no security when investors were sophisticated and had power to terminate
venture and replace manager); Casablanca Prods., Inc. v. Pace Int'l Res., Inc., 697 F.
Supp. 1563, 1567 (D. Or. 1988) (no security because plaintiff had sufficient business
expertise to enforce partnership rights). For cases applying an even stronger presumption
against security that can be rebutted only by evidence of the agreement itself, as distin-
guished from the investors' ability to exercise their powers, see Matek v. Murat, 862 F.2d
720, 730-31 (9th Cir. 1988); Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840
F.2d 236, 240-41 (4th Cir. 1988); Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 102-07 (3d Cir.
1984). The authority of Matek in the Ninth Circuit was cast in doubt by Koch v. Hankins,
928 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1991), which held that there was a question of fact whether
partners in 35 related general partnerships could meaningfully exercise control over the
overall enterprise. Id. at 1480. On the other hand, another recent case applying Koch,
relying on the partners' technical powers under the partnership agreement and requiring a
strong showing of lack of business expertise sufficient to use those powers, declined to find
a security in the general partnership situation. See Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115,
1122-23 (9th Cir. 1992) (horsebreeding partnership; court reasoned that investors who were
not knowledgeable about horsebreeding business did not show they could not have replaced
manager with someone else of similar expertise). The cases are discussed in Ribstein, supra
note 4, at 47-54.
17. The courts in these cases have refined rather than abandoned the Howey analysis.
Although the courts continue to apply the "efforts of others" factor, they have recognized
a particular fact pattern of general partnership interests as leading to a particular result under
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those in otherwise analogous nonpartnership cases in which the courts
analyze the investors' reliance on the promoters' efforts. 8
The courts should go even further than they have so far toward
characterizing partnerships as nonsecurities. The courts have been willing
only to presume against characterizing general partnership interests as
securities. 9 However, the considerations underlying the "intermediate
private ordering" approach would justify something approaching a per se
rule that partnership interests are not securities. General partners do not
expect to be covered by the securities laws because they normally have
significant power to control their firm, in contrast to passive investors in
corporate stock and other investors who rely on the efforts of third parties
to produce profits.10 In a sense, therefore, they have waived the securities
laws by contracting to be partners rather than corporate shareholders.
Moreover, because they are willing to undertake personal liability, general
partners presumably are sophisticated enough to have relatively little need
for mandatory disclosure rules.2' Indeed, many general partnerships are
either professional firms or custom-designed, tax-oriented deals.'
that factor. This hardening of fact patterns into rules is an inherent part of the process of
stare decisis. It also illustrates the continuum between rules and standards discussed in
Part IV(A). See infra Part IV.A.
18. See Ribstein, supra note 4, at 61-64.
19. See supra note 16.
20. William Carney argues that even active-participation investments, including
partnership interests, should be treated as securities as long as investors buy into an
investment structured by others and, therefore, need information about that investment
structure. See Carney, supra note 5; William J. Carney & Barbara G. Fraser, Defining a
"Security": Georgia's Struggle with the "Risk Capital" Test, 30 EMORY L.J. 73, 94 (1981).
This test is considerably broader than the one applied in the Williamson line of cases. See
supra note 16. From a policy standpoint, it is the reliance on another's management skill
which produces the special need for information that underlies the securities laws. See
Ribstein, supra note 4, at 15-16. While affirmative disclosure requirements might be
efficient in other circumstances, it is difficult to limit the application of the securities laws
in a principled way once the efforts-of-others test is abandoned.
21. See Ribstein, supra note 4, at 43.
22. This statement applies to formal general partnerships. Informal partnerships, in
which the parties may not even have explicitly agreed to be partners, may involve
financially unsophisticated parties, such as farm families. However, these are the sort of
one-on-one idiosyncratic contracts that the Court has held are not "securities." See Marine
Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559-60 (1982) (holding that one-on-one profit-sharing
arrangement was not "security").
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The Supreme Court has not yet considered whether general partnership
interests are "securities." However, it has indicated that it is willing to
follow an approach similar to that in the general partnership cases rather than
insisting on "economic reality" in every case. In Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth,' and the related case of Gould v. Ruefenacht,24 the Court held
that the securities laws apply to the purchase of close corporation "stock"
even in transactions that do not satisfy the Howey "efforts of others" factor.
To be sure, these cases are based partly on the fact that the securities laws
list "stock" as a type of "security" separately from "investment contract,"
which Howey defines. However, the Court had to deal with the argument
that no instrument should be characterized as a "security" unless it meets the
Howey "economic reality" test. Accordingly, the Court had to give policy
reasons why "economic reality" should not always control. The Court
stressed the importance of the parties' expectations and of clear rules that
provide advance notice as to whether the securities laws apply.'
The relevance of Landreth and Gould to general partnerships was
reinforced in Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc.,'
a Fourth Circuit opinion concerning general partnership interests written by
former Justice Powell, the author of Landreth and Gould. Justice Powell
reasoned, as he did in Landreth and Gould, that the "economic reality" test
did not require courts to examine each investor's need for securities law
protection.27
The Court, in holding that transactions are not covered by the securities
laws, has shown that it is willing to depart from Howey. In Reves v. Ernst
& Young,' the Court refused to apply Howey to "notes" that, like "stock,"
are expressly included in the definition of a "security." The Court said that
"[a] commitment to an examination of the economic realities of a transaction
23. 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
24. 471 U.S. 701 (1985).
25. See Ribstein, supra note 4, at 57-58 (discussing Court's reasoning).
26. 840 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1988).
27. Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 241 n.7
(4th Cir. 1988) (reasoning that "to the extent [the Williamson approach] requir[ed] a court
to look to the actual knowledge and business expertise of each partner .... [i]t. .. would
unduly broaden the scope of the Supreme Court's instruction that courts must examine the
economic reality of partnership interests").
28. 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
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does not necessarily entail a case-by-case analysis of every instrument."29
The Court held instead that a "note" is presumed to be a "security." The
presumption can be rebutted by showing either that the instrument is in one
of the categories, including consumer loans, that the courts have identified
as per se nonsecurities, or that it bears a "family resemblance" to one of
these categories. The "family resemblance" test relies heavily on elements
that both parties can readily identify at the time of the transaction, including
financing and profit motivation, tradability, investor expectations, and the
existence of other investor protection regulation. Most of these factors do
not directly relate to the investor's need for protection by mandatory
disclosure rules.
III. Application of the Theory to LLCs
While the courts have been developing a special test for whether general
partnership interests are securities, almost forty states have passed limited
liability company statutes." The rapid development and increasing use of
the LLC form raises questions whether the case law on general partnership
interests will, and should, be applied to LLCs.
LLCs are similar to general partnerships in that most LLC statutes, like
the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA), provide for a default rule of direct
management by members.3 1 Thus, Mark Sargent has argued that, because
LLC interests are more closely analogous to general partnership interests
than to corporate shares, they should be characterized presumptively as
nonsecurities.32
On the other hand, LLCs differ from general partnerships in two
important respects that relate to the definition of a "security." First, LLC
statutes provide that members are not personally liable for the debts of the
business. 33  Limited liability suggests that LLC members are no more
29. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 62 (1990).
30. The statutes are reproduced and discussed in RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note
6; 2 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES (1992 & Supp. 1994).
31. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 6, § 8.02 (discussing statutes); id. at 8-47
(table of LLC statutory provisions concerning management structure).
32. See Sargent, supra note 5, at 1097-98.
33. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 6, § 12.02; id. at 12-15 (table of LLC
statutory provisions for member nonliability).
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sophisticated and no more likely to investigate the firm or actively participate
in management than corporate shareholders.
Second, LLCs are more conducive to centralized management than
general partnerships. Some LLC statutes provide for corporate-type
centralized management,' while the others provide that LLCs may elect to
be centrally managed in their articles of organization or operating agree-
ment." Although general partnerships also may be managed by managing
partners,36 LLC statutes go further by providing a formal structure for
centralized management. This structure may have the direct legal conse-
quence of providing a clear default rule that justifies excluding nonmanaging
members from participating in the management of centrally managed
LLCs.37 Moreover, this structural difference between LLCs and partner-
ships means that some LLC investors may not expect to participate in control
to the same extent as general partners.
These differences suggest that the "intermediate private ordering"
theory does not apply to LLCs with the same force as it does to general
partnership interests. However, this Part shows that the distinctions between
34. Only the Colorado LLC statute requires management by managers. See COLO.
REV. STAT. § 7-80-401(1) (Supp. 1993). Even the Colorado statute does not prevent the
members from agreeing that they all will be statutory managers. Some statutes provide for
a default of management by managers, but allow the members to contract for management
by members. See MINN. STAT. § 322B.606 (Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-69
(Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 2013 (Supp. 1994); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
1528n, art. 2.12 (West Supp. 1994). The Minnesota and North Dakota statutes permit
members to take action that otherwise must be taken by managers and permit members to
enter into member control agreements. See MINN. STAT. § 322B.37, 322B.606(2) (Supp.
1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-50, -69(2) (Supp. 1993).
35. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 6, § 8.02 (discussing statutes); id. at 8-47
(table listing LLC statutory provisions on management form). It is not clear to what extent
this variation among LLC statutes should be relevant to the definition of a security.
Investors in any state can decide to participate in an LLC created under the laws of any
other state. Indeed, investor expectations regarding the LLC form may have been created
within a given state prior to that state's adoption of the LLC statute.
36. See Uniform Partnership Act § 18 (lead-in) (1914) (providing that all provisions
of § 18, including § 18(e) providing that partners participate equally in management, are
subject to contrary agreement) [hereinafter UPA].
37. The courts strongly presume against exclusion of nonmanaging members in
partnership cases. See ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND
RiBSTEIN ON PARTNERSFHP § 6.03, at 6:41 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
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LLCs and general partnerships do not clearly justify treating LLCs
differently from partnerships with respect to the definition of a "security."
A. Participation in Management
Although LLCs differ from general partnerships by providing a
centralized management structure, inherent features of the LLC, particularly
LLC statutory provisions and tax rules, differentiate LLCs from the sort of
passive investments that generally are characterized as securities.
1. Comparison with Limited Partnerships
LLCs differ in two critical respects from limited partnerships. First,
LLC statutes omit the limited partnership "control rule," which provides that
members who participate in control risk the loss of their limited liability.38
The control rule serves important functions in limited partnerships. The
general partners' personal liability aligns their interests with creditors, and
the control rule reinforces this alignment by assuring creditors that limited
partners will not initiate or approve transactions that are rejected by the
general partners without also assuming responsibility for the firm's debts.
The rule also helps assure the general partners, who have agreed to be
personally liable for the firm's debts, that the limiteds will not increase these
debts without the generals' consent. Without the control rule, the limited
partners have an incentive to take over management functions and "go for
broke" when the firm nears insolvency because most of the risk falls on
creditors." Thus, the control rule can significantly affect limited partners'
expectations of participating in management when this participation matters
most. It follows that the firm's decision not to adopt the limited partnership
form and its control rule involves an important governance choice, even if
under ordinary circumstances the LLC is managed precisely as it would have
been if it were a limited partnership.
38. See Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 303 (1985) [hereinafter RULPA].
39. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Comm. Corp., CIV.A. No.
12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). In Credit Lyonnais, the Delaware
Court of Chancery permitted directors of a highly leveraged firm to act in creditors'
interests rather than in those of the 98% shareholder and clearly articulated the potential
conflict of interest that is inherent in this situation.
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Second, limited partnerships differ from LLCs in terms of members'
default management rights. Limited partnership statutes give limited
partners no default management rights.4° Accordingly, limited partners
have only the rights specifically provided for in the partnership agreement.
By contrast, many LLC statutes provide specifically for member voting
rights.4 It follows that LLC members, unlike limited partners, usually will
be deemed to have certain management rights unless these are explicitly
withdrawn by the operating agreement. This may be significant in the event
of disputes about the extent of members' agreed rights.
2. Comparison with Corporations
LLCs also are inherently distinguishable from corporations regarding
the "efforts of others" element because of the difference in background
statutory rules that are applicable to the two forms of business. In a
standard-form corporation, the board of directors has the exclusive power
to initiate important transactions, such as mergers and asset sales. 42 By
contrast, LLC statutes normally provide for a default rule of management by
members. This means, in effect, that LLC members normally retain any
40. See RULPA § 302 (1985) (providing that limited partners have only those rights
provided for in partnership agreement). Section 303(b) does provide that certain limited
voting rights do not constitute participation in control. Id. § 303(b). However, this is only
a safe harbor from the control rule and not an affirmative grant of voting rights. In any
event, these voting rights are only a negative "veto" form of control rather than affirmative
participation in policy-making.
41. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10-12-24 (Supp. 1993) (amendment of operating
agreement); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-403(b)(2) (Michie Supp. 1993) (amendment of written
operating agreement or authorizing act in contravention of operating agreement); IDAHO
CODE § 53-621, -623 (Supp. 1993) (amendment of operating agreement and election of
managers); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180 §§ 5-20, 15-1, -5 (Supp. 1994) (amend-
ments); IND. CODE § 23-18-4-3(c) (Supp. 1994) (unanimous vote required for certain
matters); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.701 (West Supp. 1994) (same); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-7614 (Supp. 1993) (no transactions outside ordinary course of business bind LLC
unless approved by majority in interest of members); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1318
(West Supp. 1994) (majority vote required on certain matters); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 304-C:24(VI) (Supp. 1993) (amendment of articles); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 2020(B)
(Supp. 1994) (majority vote required on certain matters); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-21 (1992)
(same); see also RiBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 6, § 8.04 (discussing member voting
rights).
42. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (1991 & Supp. 1992) (amendment of
certificate); id. § 251 (merger); id. § 271 (sale of assets); id. § 275 (voluntary dissolution).
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power, including the power to initiate transactions, that they do not
specifically delegate to managers. 4"
3. Comparison with Nonstatutory Business Forms
Significantly, unlike parties to other types of investment contracts, such
as the one involved in Howey, LLC members have statutory control rights.
This clarifies the background default rules that courts will apply to LLCs.
By contrast, the purchaser of a distributorship, for example, has only the
rights specified in the contract and in the general law of contract. Accord-
ingly, these contracts may involve sales of a "security" if it is not evident
from the contract itself that the investor has adequate control rights."
4. The Relevance of Tax Rules
Tax rules ensure that LLC members generally will not delegate control
to managers. A business is taxed as a partnership under Subchapter K of the
Internal Revenue Code and, therefore, generally is not subject to an
additional tax on distributions if it is not a "corporation," a term that is
defined to include "associations."' In Morrissey v. Commissioner,' the
Court approved a test for determining "association" status based on
"resemblance" to corporations.47 The current "resemblance" test set forth
in the "Kintner regulations"' provides that a business organization is a
43. See, e.g. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (1993) (providing for management in
members except to extent delegated to managers). These considerations do not, of course,
apply to closely held corporations. Nor do the tax considerations discussed in section 4, see
infra Part M.A.4., justify characterizing close corporations as nonsecurities because close
corporations are generally taxed as corporations unless they elect to be governed by
Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code. Moreover, the restricted transferability of close
corporation shares (see infra section 5) also justifies presuming that close corporation shares
are not securities. Close corporation interests are securities under Landreth only because
they are "stock." See supra Part ll.B.
44. See, e.g., SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1086 (1982).
45. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (1988) (definition of "corporation"); id. § 7701(a)(2)
(definition of "partnership").
46. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
47. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 357 (1935).
48. "Kinter regulations" refers to the case that prompted the regulations, in which the
I.R.S. unsuccessfully sought to characterize a professional corporation as a partnership. See
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corporation and not a partnership if it has at least three of the following
characteristics: continuity of life, centralized management, limited liability,
and free transferability of interests.49
Because all LLCs have limited liability, a centrally managed LLC
would have to be sure that it lacks both continuity of life and free trans-
ferability in order to be assured of being taxed under Subchapter K. In light
of the uncertainty surrounding these characteristics,' this would be a risky
course of action. Moreover, a firm that does have centralized management
would have to clearly restrict transferability and the power to dissolve at
will, which could freeze in members who are unhappy with management.
Accordingly, most firms that want to combine centralized management with
limited liability and partnership tax treatment should organize as limited
partnerships and take advantage of the large number of tax rulings establish-
ing how to avoid characterization as an "association." Conversely, firms
that choose the LLC form probably are doing so precisely because of the
difference between LLCs and limited partnerships regarding member
participation in control.
Although both tax rules and LLC statutes are likely to change over
time, unlimited transferability probably never will be deemed compatible
with partnership tax treatment because this would open the partnership tax
to publicly held firms. Accordingly, as long as the general form of the
current tax classification system is retained, some kind of liquidity-based
rule probably will be used to distinguish between partnerships and corporate-
type entities for tax purposes."'
5. The Relevance of Restricted Transferability
All LLC statutes restrict transferability of LLC interests. 52 Moreover,
for reasons discussed in the preceding section, LLCs have strong tax
United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
49. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (as amended in 1993). For leading cases
interpreting the Kintner regulations, see Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729 (Ct. Cl.
1975); Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976).
50. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulation of Limited Liability and the Death of
Partnership, 70 WAsH. U. L.Q. 417 (1992).
51. See Ribstein, supra note 50, at 471-73.
52. See RIBSTEIN & KEArINGE, supra note 6, § 7.04; id. at 7-35 (table listing LLC
statutory provisions on transfer of management rights).
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incentives to restrict transferability. This restricted transferability effectively
limits the passivity of even the most remote owners. As long as transferabil-
ity is restricted either legally by share transfer restrictions or practically by
the lack of an efficient market for the firm's shares, the members cannot
respond to problems in the firm simply by selling their shares. Accordingly,
the members have incentives to gather information and to take an active role
in management. This reduces the need for mandatory disclosure rules that
ensure centralized disclosure by the firm.
Restricted transferability has other indirect effects on LLC structure.
Because LLC owners must incur higher monitoring costs than passive public
corporation shareholders, they are likely to own larger shares of their firms
in order to justify these costs. Moreover, publicly distributed LLC interests
are unlikely to have much market appeal. Outside public owners would lack
both a meaningful voice in control and the availability of an efficient
securities market to facilitate exit and monitoring by potential control
purchasers.
B. Limited Liability
Although LLC members' limited liability is an apparently important
difference between LLCs and general partnerships, on closer analysis it
should not make a critical difference in applying the securities laws. First,
personal liability has mixed implications as to whether the rationales
underlying mandatory disclosure apply in the general partnership context.
On the one hand, the partners' personal liability means that individual
investors have ample incentives to search for information concerning the
risks of the business. Thus, mandatory centralized disclosure may not be
cost-justified.53 On the other hand, these incentives to search for informa-
tion increase the likelihood that investors as a group will have incentives to
overproduce information by duplicating each others' searches.' Accord-
ingly, it is unclear whether limited liability should be critical to the existence
of a "security."
Second, even if personal liability is significant, the difference between
LLCs and partnerships in this regard is less clear than it seems to be. LLC
53. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 11, at 681 (arguing that investors' under-
investment in search costs is one justification for mandatory disclosure).
54. See id. at 681-82 (arguing that mandatory disclosure is justified in part to prevent
over-investment in search for information).
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members can, of course, give personal guarantees. Conversely, general
partners not only can contract for nonrecourse liability, but in several states
can enter into statutory "registered limited liability partnerships." '55
Moreover, even in conventional partnerships that have not contracted for
limited liability, personal liability gradually is merging in several respects
with limited liability. The trend toward applying the exhaustion requirement
even in cases of joint and several liability,56 and the clear rule to that effect
in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA),' mean that partners often
have no more than the last-resort-type liability that owners of close
corporations (and probably also LLCs) can expect to incur as guarantors, or
as a result of veil-piercing or direct responsibility for the firm's acts. Also,
RUPA allows members to shed their personal liability simply by dissociating
from the firm. 8 As a result of these developments, distinguishing between
LLCs and general partnerships on the basis of personal liability alone could
require courts to make subtle distinctions among types of LLCs and types of
partnerships.
C. Conclusion
The above analysis illustrates that investors in LLCs usually will not
need the protection of the securities laws. Nevertheless, the increased
centralization of management and the limited liability of LLCs indicate that
mandatory disclosure is more appropriate for LLC interests than for general
partnership interests. Accordingly, the next Part considers whether the
benefits of achieving the objectives of the securities laws exceed the benefits
of a clear rule that the securities laws do not apply.
55. As this Article went to press, at least 18 jurisdictions had adopted registered
limited liability partnership statutes. Two of the original statutes were those in Delaware
and Texas. See Act of June 24, 1993, 69 Del. Laws ch. 42; Texas Revised Uniform
Partnership Act, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 917 (Vernon). Also, provisions permitting
foreign limited liability partnerships have been adopted in Minnesota, Mississippi, and New
Jersey. See MINN. STAT. § 322B.901 (1994); 1994 Miss. Laws ch. 390; N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 42:2B-1 (West Supp. 1994). The Minnesota and New Jersey statutes define foreign
limited liability company to include limited liability partnerships.
56. See generally BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 37, § 5.08(d).
57. See Revised Uniform Partnership Act § 307(d) (1994) [hereinafter RUPA].
58. See id. §§ 704, 805 (eliminating most post-dissociation liability in firms that file
statements of dissociation or dissolution).
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IV. The Costs and Benefits of Emphasizing the
Form of the Transaction
This Part evaluates the costs and benefits of emphasizing the form of the
transaction and concludes that, although some LLC owners might benefit
from mandatory disclosure, a presumption against characterizing LLC
interests as securities nevertheless is justified. Emphasizing the form of the
transaction reduces the costs of complying with and adjudicating disputes
under the securities laws. Moreover, emphasizing form is consistent with
the functions of the securities laws. By facilitating contracting over
disclosure rights, emphasizing the form of the transaction tends to produce
an optimal amount of disclosure.
A. Form and Substance Under State Corporate and
Federal Securities Law
Relying on the parties' selection of business form appears to be
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's injunction that "form should be
disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic
reality. "59 Indeed, emphasis on the form of the transaction seems to breach
the fundamental distinction between state and federal law regarding the
rights of owners of business associations. A state business association statute
is essentially a standard-form contract that the parties to a firm can fashion
to suit their needs. Even if statutory provisions appear to be mandatory, the
parties often can customize their relationship by organizing under a different
state corporation statute or adopting a different business form.' The
federal securities laws are based on the different principle that certain rules,
primarily relating to disclosure, should be mandatory not only in terms, but
in the real sense that the parties cannot easily opt out of the terms simply by
choosing their business form or state of organization." This implies that
59. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
60. See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1-39 (1991); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting
Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REv. 1
(1990).
61. Federal rules are significant only because they are mandatory, for without this
feature federal law would essentially be only one more governmental unit competing with
all the others to provide nonmandatory rules. In Canada, for example, the federal
government has promulgated a business corporation statute that competes with statutes
promulgated by the provinces. For a recent description and critique of the Canadian system,
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the parties should not be able to easily avoid the securities laws by choosing
the form of their transaction.
Yet the courts cannot completely disregard form. Applying an extreme
"economic reality" rule would require courts to analyze the facts of each
case to determine whether to apply the federal securities laws. This
approach obviously would impose high burdens on courts and business
people in conforming to the law and resolving disputes. Not suprisingly,
therefore, the Supreme Court has not rigidly followed an extreme "economic
reality" approach. In Landreth, Gould, and Reves, the Court held that the
Howey "economic reality" approach does not apply in cases involving
instruments specifically listed in the statutory definition of a "security" other
than the catch-all category of "investment contracts."62  Even in the
"investment contract" cases in which Howey still reigns, Howey does not
require the courts to completely reject "form" in favor of "economic
reality." Howey established certain factors that, in effect, serve as proxies
for the ultimate question of when applying the federal securities laws is
economically justified. Instead of deciding whether each transaction is
appropriate for mandatory disclosure, the courts are to look only at formal
features of the transaction, such as the efforts-of-others and common-
enterprise elements.
The definition-of-a-security cases, instead of neatly dividing into form
(Landreth-Gould-Reves) and "economic reality" (Howey) categories, actually
lie on a form/substance continuum. The general partnership cases fall on the
"form" part of the continuum because the parties' choice of the general
partnership form essentially eliminates further consideration of the highly
variable efforts-of-others Howey factor. Thus, the basic question, which is
discussed in the next Part, is not whether the courts should emphasize form,
but how much.
B. The Form/Substance Tradeoff
The choice between emphasizing "form" or "substance" is essentially
one between "rules" and "standards."'63 Emphasizing form is "rule"-
see Ronald J. Daniels, Should Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competitive Corporate
Law Market, 36 McGILL L.J. 130 (1991).
62. See supra Part II.B.
63. The leading article is Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis
of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974). Two other often-cited articles are
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oriented in that it does not call for the exercise of significant discretion by
a decision-maker, but rather depends on the straightforward question of how
the parties have characterized the transaction. In contrast, the "economic
reality" approach requires the decision-maker to apply several factors to the
facts of each case.
As Colin Diver has noted,' the choice between rules and standards
varies from case to case and requires complex tradeoffs. Diver identified
three general policy objectives that must be compromised-transparency,
congruence with policy objectives, and accessibility. He defined these
characteristics as follows:
A rational rulemaker will .... want to use words with well-defined
and universally accepted meanings within the relevant community. I
refer to this quality as "transparency." Second, the rulemaker will
want his rule to be "accessible" to its intended audience-that is,
applicable to concrete situations without excessive difficulty or effort.
Finally, of course, a policymaker will care about whether the substan-
tive content of the message communicated in his words produces the
desired behavior. The rule should, in other words, be "congruent"
with the underlying policy objective.'
These factors balance the rule's fit with policy objectives against the
costs of applying the rule. Simple, easy-to-apply rules economize on
adjudication and contracting costs, but may allow some undesirable conduct
to escape discipline.' As discussed in Part II, characterizing LLC interests
as nonsecurities arguably compromises the securities laws' objectives
somewhat more than characterizing partnership interests as nonsecurities.
But it is also necessary to consider whether allowing waiver of the securities
laws through LLCs appropriately balances the objectives of the securities
laws against the costs of applying the "economic reality" test.
Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983),
and Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577 (1988).
For a recent discussion, see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
64. See Diver, supra note 63.
65. Id. at 67 (footnotes omitted).
66. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 63, at 268 (noting tradeoff).
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C. Producing Desired Conduct: Congruence
The "economic reality" test ensures "congruence"-the securities laws
will produce the desired level of disclosure in investment transactions. As
the Howey Court noted, the definition of a "security":
[E]mbodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable
of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by
those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of
profits. 67
In other words, because it is impossible to design a clear rule that "catches"
all undesirable conduct, some such conduct will go unpunished.68 More
to the point, holding that all LLCs are nonsecurities would leave some
passive investors who might benefit from mandatory disclosure outside
securities law protection.69 Conversely, clear rules cause some desirable
conduct to be punished. That was clearly the case in Landreth, when the
securities laws were applied to corporate "stock" despite the fact that the
Howey "efforts of others" test clearly was not satisfied.
It is important to keep in mind, however, in evaluating the "non-
congruence" problem, that the federal securities laws apply in contexts in
which the parties contract with each other. Default rules need not be
perfectly congruent with policy objectives as applied to every fact situation
so long as the parties can waive the rules by contract in situations in which
mandating disclosure would be inefficient.7' Permiting investors and
67. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.
68. The problem ofundesired conduct going unpunished was stressed in a recent article
critical of what the authors characterized as the courts' overly literal approach in the
partnership-as-security cases. See Douglas M. Branson & Karl S. Okamoto, The Supreme
Court's Literalism and the Definition of "Security' in the State Courts, 50 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 1043, 1076-85 (1993). At the same time, the authors criticize the "stock" as
"security" cases for mandating regulation in situations in which it is inappropriate. Id. at
1054-55. The authors do not consider the point made in the text that the combination of the
general partnership and "stock' cases let investors choose whether to be covered by the
securities laws in cases involving closely held firms.
69. In general, there is a danger of what Carol Rose has referred to as the potential
"booby trap" or forfeiture effect of simple rules. See Rose, supra note 63, at 597.
70. Whether rules can be characterized as mandatory depends to some extent on
whether the parties can choose their jurisdiction by contract. The parties can avoid the
federal securities laws by ensuring that the transaction does not touch U.S. interests. See,
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promoters to opt out of the securities laws by selecting the LLC form
would allow them to structure transactions that are appropriate for manda-
tory disclosure rules as corporate "stock" or limited partnerships, and other
transactions as general partnerships or LLCs.
If courts enforced contracts waiving securities law liability, non-
congruence would be a problem only to the extent that defects in the
contracting process cause investors to perversely undervalue securities law
coverage. Sellers rarely would have enough bargaining leverage to force
investors into bad deals given the thick market for fungible investment
opportunities. To be sure, sellers could mislead investors into unwise
transactions, and investors might not be able cheaply to obtain information
concerning the applicable rule. Yet as long as the general rule of nonliabil-
ity is notorious and there are many informed investors in the market, the
market price probably will reflect the absence of securities law protection.
Accordingly, the seller would gain little by not disclosing the rule. Sellers
would gain by disclosing the nonsecurity status of the investment, however,
because they would strengthen their posture in any subsequent litigation.
While default rules that are misaligned with statutory objectives
nevertheless may permit efficient bargains, mandatory rules may produce
conduct that is inconsistent with regulatory objectives. Unless contracts are
enforced, the parties cannot adjust for failures by legislators and adjudica-
tors to apply perfectly an "economic reality" test to every investment
situation. Moreover, risk-averse parties may have to disclose even in
situations in which the economic reality test ultimately would be held not
to require disclosure.7
D. Costs of Applying the Rule
An "economic reality"-type approach may impose significant costs by
requiring an adjudicator to make a difficult fact-specific inquiry in each
case about the need for disclosure. Subsection 1 discusses the difficulty of
applying the standard. Subsections 2 and 3 discuss the costs that result
e.g., Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding U.S.
securities laws inapplicable to non-U.S. transaction). State securities regulation would lie
more toward the "form" end of the continuum, not because of the substance of the
regulation, but because the parties can more easily avoid particular states than the United
States.
71. See infra Part IV.D.3.
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from the difficulty of application both ex ante, at the time of entering into
the transaction, and ex post, at the time of adjudicating disputes.
1. Difficulty of Applying the "Economic Reality" Test
There are at least two types of difficulties inherent in applying the
"efforts-of-others" prong of Howey's "economic reality" approach. First,
the court must determine the degree of the investors' involvement in
management. In a partnership, this would involve determinations, among
other things, of the partners' explicit voting or management rights, their
"background" right to participate in management under the partnership
statute to the extent that it is not specifically negated by the agreement,72
and their effective veto power implicit in their ability to dissolve the firm
at will.73 These determinations are likely to vary from case to case
because partnerships are highly customized arrangements.
Second, the "efforts of others" test requires courts to evaluate the
expected impact of investors' efforts on the success of the enterprise. For
example, in a partnership or LLC each owner may have little power to
cause the firm to take a particular action, but nevertheless has the power to
block actions. It may not be clear what effect a veto or a latent power to
veto has on a firm's success. Moreover, even when the members actively
participate in a management decision, it often will not be clear how much
each member's participation contributed to the firm's success.7 4
2. Litigation Costs
The difficulty of applying the "economic reality" test can make
litigation costly by multiplying the legal and factual issues that must be
72. See UPA § 18(e), (h) (1914); RUPA § 401 (f), (i), (j) (1994) (unless otherwise
provided in partnership agreement partners have rights to participate equally in management
and to veto admission of new partners and extraordinary acts).
73. See UPA §§ 31, 38(1) (1914) (partner has power to dissolve firm at will and,
subject to contrary agreement, cause firm to liquidate); RUPA § 801 (1994) (partner has
power to dissolve and cause to liquidate partnership at will).
74. The difficulty in determining each member's contribution to the firm's success is
similar to the issue in the franchise context in which the enterprise's success turns on both
the franchisee-investor's management of the outlet and the franchisor-promoter's
management of the overall enterprise. See, e.g., Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc.,
324 F. Supp. 640 (D. Colo. 1970).
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determined at trial.7' Moreover, this difficulty can increase the likelihood
of litigation. Because the outcome of the case may be difficult to predict
at the time of litigation, the parties may have very different expectations
about whether liability will be imposed. This, in turn, decreases the
probability of settling the suit prior to litigation.76
3. Overdeterrence
The uncertainty inherent in applying the "economic reality" standard
can increase the parties' costs of determining in the planning stage whether
the standard applies to their transaction. This may cause the parties to
avoid transactions or incur disclosure costs to minimize the risk of liability
although the law was never intended to require disclosure in the particular
situation.77 In other words, the "economic reality" test may deter
desirable conduct.
4. Increasing Contracting Costs
Applying a clear rule is desirable because establishing clear property
rights allows people to make contracts based on the known rule.78 Sup-
pose, for example, that the parties know that the securities laws apply, as
they do in post-Landreth close corporation cases. If the beneficiary of
securities law protection is unwilling to pay the price of the securities law
warranty, the parties may attempt to obtain an exemption or choose the
partnership form. Conversely, if, as in the general partnership situation,
the parties can be fairly sure that the securities laws do not apply, the
promoter may lower the price to reflect the fact that the transaction does
not come with a warranty of truthfulness. Alternatively, the promoter may
75. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection ofDisputesforLitigation,
13 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 13-17 (1984); Larry E. Ribstein, Takeover Defenses and the Corporate
Contract, 78 GEO. L.J. 71 (1989) (discussing similar effect of applying vague business
judgment rule to takeover defenses).
76. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 63, at 265.
77. See id. at 262-64 (noting effect of standards on "primary behavior"); see also
Kaplow, supra note 63, at 605 (noting effect of parties' risk aversion on chilling effect
problem). For a discussion of this problem in connection with applying the definition of
"security" to new hybrid instruments, see Eric A. Chiappinelli, Reinventing a Security:
Arguments for a Public Interest Definition, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 957 (1992).
78. On the role of clear allocations of property rights in effectuating contracting, see
Clifford G. Holderness, A Legal Foundation for Exchange, 14 J. LEG. STUD. 321 (1985).
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choose to offer an explicit warranty or to restructure the transaction so that
the securities laws apply.
Suppose, on the other hand, that the transaction is governed by the
"economic reality" approach. Because of the parties' diverging expecta-
tions about whether the securities laws apply, it may be costly for them to
negotiate the price of this possible securities law protection. Moreover, the
parties will discount the value of possible securities law protection to reflect
the possibility that it will not apply. This may reduce the value of the
waiver to the point where it is not worth it to the parties to incur the costs
of obtaining an exemption or designing the transaction. Accordingly, any
liability that is imposed would be inconsistent with the contract the parties
would have made if the rule had been clear.
Landreth and Gould made precisely the ex ante predictability point
stressed here. The Landreth Court stressed that "persons trading in
traditional stock likely have a high expectation that their activities are
governed by the Acts. "'I Applying the "sale of a business" doctrine would
make "coverage by the Acts ... in most cases ... unknown and un-
knowable to the parties at the time the stock was sold"' because whether
or not the "stock" was a "security" would depend on whether the purchaser
acquired control."1 As the Gould Court noted, control would turn not
only on the percentage of stock purchased, but also on specific voting rights
or the purchaser's expectations of being involved in the management.
This point meshes with the above discussion concerning the impor-
tance of contracts to the "congruence" of the rule with the statute's
objectives. An important cost of applying the vague "economic reality" test
is that it impedes the formation of contracts that would further the statute's
objectives by ensuring the optimal amount of disclosure. In short, it is
possible both to apply rules congruently with policy objectives and to
minimize the costs of applying rules.
E. Conclusion
The courts should define "security" with a view to the appropriate
tradeoff between the costs of determining and applying the rule, on the one
79. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 693.
80. Id. at 696.
81. Id. at 694-95.
82. See Gould, 471 U.S. at 705 (holding that purchase of 50% interest was "security").
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hand, and congruence with policy objectives on the other. Consistent with
these objectives, the courts should allow parties effectively to waive the
securities laws by selecting the LLC form. This would reflect the same
sort ofjudgment that the Supreme Court made in Landreth and Gould when
it let parties opt into the securities laws by investing in corporate stock
although the "economic reality" test would not otherwise apply.
It is worth noting that opting out by selecting the transaction form is
a second-best rule. Although it is preferable to a case-by-case economic
reality approach for LLCs, the best rule is to let investors both waive
coverage by specific contracts in corporate "stock" cases and contract for
coverage in general partnership and LLC cases. Coupling opt-out and
transaction form may force investors to incur the higher costs of adopting
a form that may be undesirable for tax and other non-securities-law
reasons. The explicit-term approach, however, would contravene the anti-
waiver provisions in the securities laws as they are currently written.83
The federal securities laws reflect the legislative judgment that statutory
coverage should not be the subject of conventional private ordering. Until
that judgment changes, opting out must be restricted to form-selection.
V. Specific Issues in Applying the Theory
This Part elaborates on the general analysis discussed above by
discussing specific issues that arise in characterizing LLCs as nonsecurities.
A. LLC Interests as "Stock"
Professor Marc Steinberg has argued that LLC interests should be
characterized as per se securities. Steinberg reasons that because LLC
interests are issued by a "company," investors expect that their interests are
"securities" as long as LLC interests have the usual characteristics of
"stock" discussed in Landreth.'4
There are several problems with this analysis. First, and most
importantly, Landreth explicitly applies only to instruments that are
denominated "stock" and, therefore, are listed separately from "investment
contracts" in the statutory definition of a "security. "85 The Court reasoned
83. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
84. See Steinberg & Conway, supra note 5, at 1116.
85. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 686.
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that an instrument denominated "stock" was necessarily a "security" as long
as it had the common attributes of corporate "stock," not that anything that
resembled "stock" was a "security."
Second, even if Landreth does apply to any instrument that investors
would expect to be treated like "stock," investors would not have such
expectations merely because of the use of the word "company" in LLCs-a
word that is often applied to partnerships.
Third, even if the Landreth test does apply, LLC interests are not
conventional "stock" under that test. The Landreth test emphasizes:
"(i) the right to receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of
profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability to be pledged or hypothecated; (iv)
the conferring of voting rights in proportion to the number of shares
owned; and (v) the capacity to appreciate in value. "86 LLC statutes
usually do not provide for dividend rights (factor (i)),87 invariably restrict
transferability of management rights (factor (ii)),88 and may allocate
voting rights per capita rather than pro rata (factor (iv)).89 Factor (iii) is
no more true of LLC interests than of general partnership interests, and
factor (v) applies to virtually any asset.
B. Variations Among LLCs and the Strength of the Presumption
Even if the LLCs generally should be nonsecurities, there is an
additional question of how far this form-over-substance rule should be
86. Id. at 686 (quoting United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851
(1975)).
87. LLC statutes do not give members default distribution rights, but rather provide
that members are entitled to distributions only as specified by the operating agreement. See
RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 6, § 6.02 (discussing statutes); id. at 6-13 (table listing
statutory provisions on right to receive distributions).
88. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
89. Statutes that provide for a default rule of member voting per capita include ALA.
CODE § 10-12-22(b)(1) (Supp. 1993); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-681.E (1992); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 4-32-403 (Michie Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-308 (Michie Supp.
1993); IDAHO CODE § 53-623 (Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7612 (Supp. 1993);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1318.A (West Supp. 1994); Mo. REV. STAT. § 347.079(4)
(Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8403(1) (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-
C:24(V) (Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-20(b) (1993); see also RIBSTEIN &
KEATINGE, supra note 6, § 8.03, at 8-8 (discussing statutes); id. at 8-49 (table listing LLC
statutory provisions on allocation of voting rights).
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carried. Because LLCs have limited liability, LLC members are more
likely than general partners to be passive owners. This means that more
LLCs than general partnerships will adopt corporate-type or limited
partnership-type centralized management. Thus, characterizing all LLCs
as nonsecurities involves a significant risk that regulatory costs will exceed
the benefits of relying on form. For these reasons, unlike general
partnerships,' use of the LLC form should generate only a rebuttable
presumption of non-"security."
In determining what facts should rebut the presumption, it is important
to keep in mind the cost/benefit tradeoff of relying on form. Relying on
case-specific factors may increase contracting and litigation costs beyond
any regulatory benefit of ensuring conduct congruent with statutory
objectives. That would certainly result if, for example, the courts
attempted to finely distinguish LLCs based on members' participation in
control. It probably also would result if courts made distinctions based on
the number of interests sold, unless that number could be established by
means of a clear rule rather than through case-by-case adjudication.
C. A Constitutional Basis for the Rule
Characterizing LLCs as nonsecurities may be not only efficient and
consistent with the securities laws, but also necessary in order to prevent
unconstitutional applications of the securities laws. The basic question is
whether requiring registration of LLC interests under the Securities Act of
1933 (1933 Act) is an unconstitutional restriction on advertising under the
First Amendment. The securities laws arguably go too far under the First
Amendment by prohibiting even truthful advertising without a sufficient
government interest. 91 The First Amendment issue is particularly acute
in light of recent Supreme Court cases that have struck down restrictions
on advertising as not sufficiently compelled by a substantial government
interest.' Even if the 1933 Act is generally constitutional, the strong
90. See supra text accompanying note 19.
91. See Michael E. Schoeman, The First Amendment and Restrictions on Advertising
of Securities Under the Securities Act of 1933, 41 Bus. LAW. 377 (1986); see also Henry
N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Governance Speech and the FirstAmendment, 42
KAN. L. REv. (forthcoming 1994).
92. See Ibanez v. Florida Board of Accountancy, 114 S. Ct. 2084, 2086-87 (1994)
(striking down censure of CPA for using "Certified Financial Planner" designation on
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
policy arguments against applying the securities laws in this context"
suggest that the Act goes too far under the First Amendment if it is
construed to compel registration of all LLC interests unless the firms
comply with exemptions requiring elaborate disclosures and investor
qualifications. The First Amendment may compel at least a presumption
that LLC interests need not be registered under the 1933 Act.
V. Qualifying the Analysis
The analysis so far has focused on the current definition of "security"
under the federal securities laws. This Part discusses some limitations on
this analysis in applying it to antifraud remedies, to state securities laws,
and under a different definition of a "security."
A. Antifraud vs. Registration Provisions
The worst case for holding that LLCs are nonsecurities is when this
facilitates fraud rather than merely an exemption from the registration
requirements. This result would give promoters a strong incentive to adopt
the LLC form, whatever the transaction costs imposed by business form,
solely to extract wealth from investors by fraud. By comparison,
nonfraudulent promoters usually would have to pay investors to bear any
additional risk inherent in unregistered shares. Thus, a strict form versus
substance rule should be applied only in connection with registration, and
not to application of the antifraud provisions.
Nevertheless, LLC interests probably should not be federal "securi-
ties" even for purposes of the antifraud rules. First, this result would be
inconsistent with the current structure of the securities laws, which apply
ground that regulator failed to show that using designation without its required disclaimer
was either inherently or potentially misleading); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
Inc., 113 S.Ct. 1505, 1510 (1993) (city's removal of newsracks that distributed magazines
consisting primarily of advertising could not be sustained under First Amendment on ground
that it would improve appearance of city's streets because singling out 62 "commercial"
newsracks from 1500 to 2000 newsracks on public property had inconsequential effect on
beautification); Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S.Ct. 1792, 1800 (1993) (state's ban on solicitations
by CPAs was not adequately supported by showing that such solicitation would compromise
independence of CPAs or result in fraud or overreaching).
93. See generally supra Part III.A-C.
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virtually the same definition of "security" to both the antifraud and
registration provisions.94 The 1933 Act makes the anti-fraud/registration
distinction by exempting certain transactions from registration require-
ments95 rather than by defining instruments as nonsecurities for registra-
tion purposes only. Second, from a policy standpoint, the federal securities
laws are an appropriate supplement to state fraud law only because they
provide an efficient way to adjudicate and administer remedies in connec-
tion with interstate schemes. 96 This consideration does not justify a
federal remedy in connection with firms that, like LLCs, are inherently
closely held.
B. State vs. Federal Securities Laws
The same considerations that apply to the federal definition of "secu-
rity" also should apply to state definitions. Not only do state statutes use
language that is virtually identical to the federal definition,' but precisely
the same policy considerations discussed above concerning appropriate
tradeoffs between rules and standards apply to state as to federal rules.
Professors Douglas Branson and Karl Okamoto nevertheless argue for a
different result under state law.98 They maintain that state securities
regulators need not be constrained by federalism concerns, that the need to
coordinate federal and state registration requirements does not apply to the
scope of the law, and that differing state rules would be a useful laboratory.
However, notwithstanding these distinctions between state and federal law,
the need for clear-cut rules and the congruence between excluding LLCs
and the policy objectives of the securities laws remain. Although Branson
and Okamoto point to a trend in state courts toward holding that general
partnership interests are securities, 99 the cases they cite in support of this
94. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988). The latter provision excludes instruments with
a term of less than nine months from the definition. Id.
95. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1988).
96. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 11, at 679-80.
97. See UNIF. SEC. ACT (1956), § 401(1), 7B U.L.A. 580 (1985) (adopted in 35
states); UNIF. SEC. AcT (1985), § 101(16), 7B U.L.A. 77 (Supp. 1994).
98. See Branson & Okamoto, supra note 68.
99. Id. at 1086-88.
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trend actually mirror the federal cases in their reliance on the Williamson
presumption against "security." 1°
Notwithstanding these considerations, two recent administrative
hearings in Illinois and Georgia suggest that the states may be leaning
toward characterizing LLC interests as securities. The cases involved the
same defendant, Express Communications, which sold interests in LLCs
that licensed and developed wireless communications systems. In both
cases, administrative law judges found violations of state securities law
arising out of sales of LLC interests. More importantly, both cases applied
the fact-specific version of Howey in determining that LLC interests were
securities.
In the Illinois case, 0 1 the judge purported to apply Williamson, but
reasoned that that case is simply "a word reformulation of the Howey facts
and circumstances test."" This is inconsistent with the language in
Williamson, the federal cases that rely on Williamson, and the reasoning
discussed in this Article supporting a clear rule rather than a highly flexible
case-by-case determination.
In the Georgia proceeding, 3 the judge rejected arguments that LLC
interests were per se securities"° or "stock."'' 5 At the same time, the
judge repeatedly emphasized that the issue must be determined by a fact-
100. See Casali v. Schultz, 732 S.W.2d 836, 837-38 (Ark. 1987); State v. Riba-
deneira, 817 P.2d 1105, 1109-11 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Kramer, 804 S.W.2d
845, 848 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Probst v. State, 807 P.2d 279, 285 (Okla. Crim. App.
1991); Garrett v. Snedigar, 359 S.E.2d 283, 286 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987); Branson &
Okamoto, supra note 68, at 1088 n.249. Moreover, Garrett reversed a lower court
finding that the instruments were securities, Garrett, 359 S.E.2d at 286, and Ribadeneira
involved instruments that were structured essentially as limited partnership interests,
Ribadeneira, 817 P.2d at 1108. For a current survey of state blue sky developments
involving LLCs, see Mark A. Sargent, Will Limited Liability Companies Punch a Hole in
the Blue Sky?, 21 SEC. REG. L.J. 429 (1994).
101. Express Communications, Inc., No. 9200106 (III. Secretary of St. See. Dept.
Dec. 13, 1993).
102. Id. at 16.
103. Cleland v. Express Communications, Inc., No. 50-93-0075 (Ga. See. Comm'r
Apr. 14, 1994).
104. Id. at 41.
105. Id. at 46.
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specific analysis under Howey. " The judge appears, therefore, explicit-
ly to have rejected the idea that the form of the transaction should
matter. 7 Although the judge purported to apply Williamson, as in the
Illinois proceeding, the judge did not require the strong showing of reliance
on the unique expertise of the promoter that Williamson required in the
general partnership context. 08 Instead, the judge cited the investors' lack
of direct involvement in management, 109 their geographical dispersion, and
the technical nature of the investment.
C. Changing State and Federal Definitions of a "Security"
The discussion so far has focused on the definition of a "security" in
its current form in state and federal securities law statutes. If LLCs are
included in this definition, it is only by means of the vague "investment
contract" language. As discussed in this Article, an appropriate tradeoff
between the costs and benefits of rules and standards justifies a judicial
gloss under that language that explicitly excludes LLCs.
The analysis arguably differs if the definition of "security" is changed
explicitly to include "limited liability companies." Obviously there would
106. Id. at 43-44 (emphasizing substance over form); id. at 46 (issue is whether
transactions are securites "under the specific facts and circumstances of this case"); id. at
55 (Howey requires examination of "economic reality" rather than degree of control by
promoter, and emphasizes substance over form). The judge also rejected the argument that
the tax characterization of LLCs as partnerships should matter. Id. at 53-54. However, the
judge apparently did not consider the potential relevance of tax classification to investor
expectations of participation in control, see supra Part M.A.4., but simply noted instead that
the classification factors had nothing to do with Howey.
107. The theory that form should matter was presented in expert testimony by this
author in both the Illinois and Georgia proceedings.
108. See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also Carney, supra note 5
(criticizing Cleland for failing to require strong showing of reliance on promoter's
expertise).
109. The judge curiously interpreted Williamson as not concluding that actual control
is irrelevant, based on his statement that investors must have "real" power that they can
exercise. Cleland v. Express Communications, Inc., No. 50-93-0075, at 59 (Ga. Sec.
Comm'r Apr. 14, 1994). There is, however, an obvious difference between real power to
control and actual exercise of control. In light of the weakness of this analysis of
Williamson, the judge seems to have been more persuaded by the fact that not requiring
actual control would "circumvent the 'economic reality' analysis." Id.
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be no justification for applying the judicial gloss recommended in this
Article under this explicit language. More fundamentally, this definition
would reduce the problems of ex ante predictability and ex post litigation
costs that are addressed by the suggested judicial gloss."0  The only
remaining problem would be one of noncongruence with policy objectives
given the closely held nature of the firm. However, this problem would be
ameliorated by the fact that parties to closely held firms could still contract
for coverage by the securities laws by choosing between the partnership and
LLC- "stock" transaction forms.
The analysis would differ still further under state securities laws whose
definition of "security" explicitly covered "limited liability compa-
nies. "III Changing the definition under state, but not federal, law argu-
110. Including LLCs under the definition of "security" would not entirely eliminate the
problems of ex ante predictability or ex post litigation costs. The courts would still have
to determine whether a firm was a "limited liability company." This could be a problem
when the firm was not properly formed. For cases involving the analogous "limited
partnership" issue, see Solomont v. Polk Dev. Co., 54 Cal. Rptr. 22, 24-27 (1966) (defects
prevented formation of partnership so that blue sky law required registration, permitting
limited partners to rescind); Garbo v. Hilleary Franchise Sys., Inc., 479 S.W.2d 491, 500
(Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (even if limited partnership not generally security, this one is because
of provisions deviating from usual limited partnership). Adding a reference to "limited
liability companies" also might present problems as to firms formed under foreign laws
differing signficantly from U.S. LLC statutes. For a discussion of the problems of making
this determination, see RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE, supra note 6, § 13.03.
111. Some states have changed their definitions to deal explicitly with LLCs, but only
one clearly defines an LLC interest as a security. See Act effective July 1, 1995, 1994
Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 99, § 3 (defining LLC interest as "security") (to be codified at
ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.130(12)); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-1107(n) (Michie Supp. 1993)
("Nothing in this Chapter [the limited liability company act] shall be construed as
establishing that a limited liability company interest is not a 'security'."); Act effective July
1, 1994, 1994 Ind. Legis. Serv. 1232 (West) (defining LLC interest as "security" unless
person claiming it is not "security" can prove that all members are actively engaged in
management) (to be codified at IND. CODE § 23-2-1-1(k)(iii)); Act effective Apr. 14, 1993,
1993 Mich. Legis. Serv. 23, § 1103 (West) ("An interest in a limited liability company to
which this act applies is a security to the same extent as an interest in a corporation,
partnership, or limited partnership is a security."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B-2.V (Michie
Supp. 1994) (LLC interests are securities, "unless the context requires otherwise"); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.010) (Baldwin Supp. 1994) (defining "security" to include
"membership interests in limited liability companies"); Act of Dec. 13, 1993, 1994 Wis.
Legis. Serv. ch. 112, § 351 (West) (presuming LLC interest to be security if right to
manage LLC is vested in one or more managers or if LLC has more than 35 members) (to
be codified at WIs. STAT. § 551.02(13)(c)); Sargent, supra note 100, at 435-38 (discussing
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ably would address the "congruence" problem because closely held LLCs,
which arguably should not be "securities," could choose to avoid states that
defined these interests as securities. Thus, insofar as LLC offerings are
genuinely closely held firms, regulatory costs would be internalized in the
regulating states. This approach therefore would offer the benefits of
"laboratories" of state rules112 without the potential danger of states'
impeding national offerings"' and imposing regulatory costs on out-of-
state promoters for the benefit of local interest groups." 4 While national
offerings of LLC interests might be impeded by registration requirements
in individual states, it is precisely in this situation that the justification for
applying the securities laws is strongest. At the same time, a federal rule
that attempted to distinguish between large and small offerings on a case-
by-case basis under the definition of a "security" would present predict-
ability and adjudication problems.
In short, the best way to approach the characterization of LLC
interests under the securities laws may be for individual states to address
the issue explicitly. Indeed, refusing to extend the general "investment
contract" language to limited liability companies may have the salutary
effect of moving regulators to this preferred approach.
VII. Concluding Remarks
Insisting that the federal securities laws be applied on a complex, fact-
specific basis does not make sense in light of the high adjudication and
statutes).
112. See Branson & Okamoto, supra note 68, at 1048. Branson and Okamoto's
argument regarding the states as laboratories ignores the potential problems discussed in the
text of externalization of costs and imposing additional registration costs on offerings that
do not otherwise have to register.
113. Branson and Okamoto argue that the need for coordination of registration
requirements does not apply to the scope of securities laws. Id. at 1073-74. However,
applying different definitions of "security" at the federal and state levels would require
registration of offerings that are exempt at the federal level. This would be inconsistent with
the goal of coordination of registration requirements to reduce the marginal costs of
complying with state law in national offerings. As discussed in the text, however, this
consideration does not apply to closely held firms.
114. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Origin of the Blue Sky Laws,
70 TEx. L. REv. 347 (1991) (explaining state securities legislation as effort by in-state
bankers to preclude competition by out-of-state securities firms).
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predictability costs of applying vague standards. The Supreme Court has
recognized these problems by making it clear in close corporation cases
that the form of the transaction matters. The advent of the LLC should
provide an interesting case study of how far the Court is prepared to go in
this direction. If the Court joins the nearly universal trend in the lower
courts, it will hold that a general partnership is presumptively not a
security. This Article shows that it should go one step further and apply
a similar rule to interests in limited liability companies.
This Article's analysis has implications that extend beyond LLCs. The
costs of applying an open-ended definition of "security" become increasing-
ly important as legislatures develop new types of firms, including limited
liability partnerships.11 Accordingly, the courts and legislatures must
find ways to accommodate the goals of the securities laws with those of the
financial markets.
This Article also shows how federal and state regulation can play
different roles with respect to regulation of LLCs. Perhaps the states
should play a greater role than the federal government in regulating this
sort of closely held business. However, they should do so by enacting
explicit rules rather than by applying open-ended definitions of a
"security."
115. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.

